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By SKF NARA Date 12/3/1980

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(sent to DDCI  
week-end of 8/1.)

TO : The Acting Secretary  
FROM: INR - Roger Kilderman

FM:

INTELLIGENCE NOTE: ANALYSIS OF SOVIET NOTE ON GERMANY

Purpose of Note. Moscow's August 3 note is designed to serve two purposes; (1) to bring the West into 4- or 6-power talks on Soviet terms; (2) to win support from the uncommitted countries. It does this by standing firm on the separate treaty threat and by offering a little in bait for negotiations. It is both a low-key polemic against the US note and an effective presentation of the Soviet position.

Bait for Talks. The note is more positive on the need for negotiations. But it still stops short of offering a 4- or 6-power conference, evidently, to avoid any sign of weakness. The June 4 Soviet memo called only for a peace conference and made only elliptical allusions to a negotiating conference. This note does not mention a peace conference. Instead it expresses Soviet readiness to take part in discussions, with a peace treaty as their goal (by implication the discussions would be a 4-power summit conference).

In addition, the note repeatedly cites, as a potential agenda formula, the "question of a peaceful settlement with Germany"-- a formula loose enough to accommodate the positions of both sides. Finally, the note, while repeating the separate treaty threat, does not mention a deadline.

More Rigid on Terms of Settlement. The note suggests that the US should set forth the terms it thinks "should be reflected in a peace treaty." Except for this it makes no offer to consider anything but the Soviet peace treaty and "free city"

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and "free city" proposals. In contrast, the June 4 memorandum expressed readiness to examine "any constructive proposals" on a German treaty and "normalization" of West Berlin and suggested there might be alternatives to the "free city proposals".

I am sending separately an analysis of a portion of the note indicating a possible shift on the Soviet approach on Berlin.

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